Why the Soul Might Be a Myth: A Philosophical and Scientific Perspective

The soul has long been considered the immortal essence of who we are. But modern philosophy and neuroscience challenge this idea with compelling arguments.

One key critique is the category mistake: treating the mind as a non-physical 'thing' rather than a set of processes and activities of the brain. This error underpins many dualist arguments that posit a separate soul.

Thought experiments like imagining oneself floating in empty space or considering split-brain patients reveal limitations in the soul hypothesis. While these scenarios challenge simplistic physicalist accounts, they do not conclusively prove the existence of an immaterial soul.

Instead, the mind is best understood as embodied brain activity, dynamically producing consciousness and identity without needing to invoke mysterious substances.

This perspective aligns with scientific evidence and encourages a naturalistic understanding of selfhood.

Based on philosophical critiques and neuroscience findings, including works by Richard Swinburne and Daniel Dennett. 4 1